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Abstract
For any software system upon which lives depend, the most
important question one can ask about it is, ‘How do we know
the system is safe?’ Despite the critical importance of this
question, no widely accepted, generally applicable answer
exists. Instead, debate continues to rage over the question,
with theorists and practitioners quarrelling with each other
and amongst themselves. This paper suggests a possible way
forward towards quelling the quarrels, based on refining the
critical safety question into additional questions, which may
be more likely to have answers on which a consensus can be
reached.
1 Introduction
'Is the system safe?'
'Do we think the system is safe?'
In an ideal world for any specific system, the answer to the
first question is the same as the answer to the second. That is,
if we think the system is safe, then it is safe; and if we do not
think the system is safe, then it is not safe.
But the real world is not an ideal world. In the real world the
answers to the two questions may differ. We may think a
system is safe when it is not, and we may think a system is
not safe when it is.
The orthogonality of the two questions is especially apparent
today in software-intensive systems. While many software
safety experts lament the lack of adequate means for
assessing the safety of software systems, denounce existing
software standards as based on weak or non-existent
foundations, and warn against increasing reliance on
automated systems, the actual safety record of software-based
systems has been exceptionally good to date. So good in
fact, that a strong case can be made, at least for commercial
aviation, that no technology yet introduced has had a more
positive effect on safety than has software. On the other
hand, despite the excellent safety record to date, the
arguments about future dangers seem quite persuasive,
particularly as systems become increasingly complex, and
more and more authority is given to automated systems to
perform safety-critical functions.
We believe that to understand adequately the discrepancy
between current practice and theory, and to speculate
intelligently about what may happen in the future,
foundational epistemic questions related to software system
safety must be carefully and systematically considered. In
this brief paper, we suggest what some of those fundamental
questions may be.
2 Definitions
We begin with definitions for, and discussion about, some of
the words and phrases that are used in the paper. Although
some of the questions listed later in the paper can be
understood without understanding these definitions, some
cannot.
2.1 Concerning Knowledge
Epistemic is an adjective meaning ‘of or relating to
knowledge or degree of acceptance’ [25]. Epistemology is a
noun defined as ‘the theory or science of the method or
grounds of knowledge’ [25]. Epistemology is one of the
major branches of study in philosophy [5]; it is concerned
with searching for answers to questions such as, ‘What is
knowledge,’ and ‘How is knowledge acquired?’
The verbs believe, think, and know, which are used in relation
to knowledge, all have multiple shades of meaning, and tend
to be used somewhat differently by different people. One
person may use the three verbs almost interchangeably. For
such a person, these three questions are essentially identical:
Do I believe the system is safe? Do I think the system is
safe? Do I know the system is safe?
Another person may use the three words to express graduated
levels of confidence. For such a person, the three questions
are quite different; answering them affirmatively requires
different levels of personal certainty in the safety of the
system. For example, believe may correspond to ‘more likely
than not’, think to ‘very likely’, and know to ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ (or perhaps to even a stronger standard).
For the purposes of this paper, we adopt this level-of-
confidence based approach1.
1 Although we know that any philosopher reading this paper will
consider the discussion in this section woefully simplistic and
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Regardless of a particular individual’s use of the three verbs,
he or she may be wrong. For example, someone may believe,
think, or know that the 4th International Conference on
System Safety 2009 is being held in Birmingham. The
strength of the individual’s level of confidence does change
the fact that he or she is simply wrong [3, 7, 11].
2.2 Concerning Safety
The noun safety can be defined absolutely as ‘freedom from
accidents or losses’ [23], with the adjective safe thus similarly
meaning ‘free from accidents or losses.’ Such definitions are
recognized to be ideals, which are not fully achievable in
practice. No system can be truly said to be absolutely and
forever free from accidents or losses. So, in practice the
words tend to be used relativistically. Commercial air travel
is said to be safe, for example. This attribution of safety does
not mean that no accidents or losses ever occur in commercial
air travel, but that accidents and losses occur with sufficient
rarity as to be acceptable.
Understanding the practical definition of safety thus requires
understanding the meaning of acceptable. How much
freedom from accidents and losses is acceptable? Answers to
that question have varied over time, among different domains,
and even among different individuals [22, 27, 33].
In the context of system safety, these variations may be
subsumed by an operational definition of acceptability for
each system. For commercial air travel, the acceptability of its
current level of freedom from accidents and losses is seen in
the combination of the facts that users continue to fly,
engineers and companies continue to produce aircraft and
other components necessary for air travel, regulatory bodies
continue to produce regulations for air travel, and
governments continue to allow air travel within their
boundaries. No one of these facts alone necessarily implies
acceptable safety, but taken together they do.
2.3 Understanding the Original Questions
Based on the above definitions, the first question that opened
this paper (‘Is the system safe?’) may be understood to be
equivalent to ‘Is the system acceptably free from accidents
and losses?’ Adopting the confidence-level-based definitions
for believe, think, and know, and assuming that for safety-
critical systems, the highest level of confidence is required,
the second question (‘Do we think the system is safe?’) may
be better stated as ‘Do we know the system is safe?’ That is,
‘Do we have confidence at least beyond a reasonable doubt
that the system is acceptably free from accidents and losses?’
The remainder of the paper concerns this latter question. For
simplicity of expression, we revert to the shorter form, relying
on the reader to mentally translate to the longer form when
3 Foundational Epistemic Questions
For any system upon which lives depend, the system should
not only be safe, but the designers, operators, and regulators
of the system should also know that it is safe. For software-
intensive systems, universal agreement on what is necessary
to justify knowledge of safety does not exist. Theorists and
practitioners have long quarrelled with each other and among
themselves over the issue. The wide range of existing
opinions, and the emotional fervour with which these
opinions are held [28], suggests that reaching a consensus is
not soon likely.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of consensus is that
the community is trying to answer the broad questions,
without first refining those questions into more foundational
questions. Such a situation is analogous to a jury in a
criminal trial trying to answer the ultimate question, ‘Is the
defendant guilty,’ without first answering questions whose
answers provide evidence upon which to base the ultimate
answer. Questions such as, ‘Was the defendant present at the
scene of the crime’, ‘Did the defendant have the means to
commit the crime’, and ‘Could someone be trying to frame
the defendant?’
In the remainder of this section, we suggest what some of the
foundational questions may be. These suggestions are not
complete. Not only are there additional questions that should
be considered, but most of the questions listed below need to
be further refined. Questions about existing systems are
discussed first, followed by questions about future systems.
3.1 Questions About Existing Systems
Existing systems may be divided into two main categories:
systems that have been operating for sufficiently long that
they are known to be safe, and systems that have not been
operating that long2. Epistemic questions concerning both
categories are generally similar, with the exception of the
following question:
What is necessary for a system in use to be considered to
have its safety effectively demonstrated? Is passage of
some period of time without any unacceptable accidents
or losses sufficient? Or is something additional needed?
What is known about the effect of the specific
operational environment on the safety of the system?
Specifically, is that effect known well enough to be able
to accurately assess the safety consequences of changes
in the operational environment?
The questions that apply to both categories include the
following:
necessary.
2 A third category is also possible: systems that are operating and
considered to be unsafe. For the purposes of this paper, we assume,
incomplete, we believe that it is sufficiently detailed and complete idealistically, that such systems are taken out of service as soon as
for the intended audience of the paper. 	 they are recognized as unsafe.
• How is operational safety best measured? That is, what
information must be collected and analyzed to provide
adequate confidence that a system in use is truly
acceptably free from accidents and loses?
How should differences in evaluations of safety be
reconciled? For example, consider a software-intensive
medical device, which is considered safe by the
appropriate regulatory authority, but which has
occasionally failed in such a way as to lead to successful
lawsuits against its manufacturer. What should be done
in this case? What evidence is needed to permit an
informed decision to be made by the regulatory
authority?
• To what extent should measures of operational safety be
compared to pre-deployment evaluations of expected
safety? Might regular comparisons result in better
understanding of the efficacy of system safety evaluation
procedures and tools?
• What maintenance, if any, does the system require to
maintain its safety? What information must be collected
to ensure adequate maintenance is performed?
When an accident or loss occurs in an existing system,
additional epistemic questions arise, including the following:
• What information about the system and its state at the
time of the accident must be available to investigators to
enable them to gain sufficient knowledge to be able to
conduct a thorough investigation? What do investigator
do if adequate information is not available? (See [18] for
example of such a situation).
• How do the investigators know that they have found the
relevant causes and contributing factors to the accident or
loss?
• How can the knowledge gained from identifying the
causes and contributing factors be used to improve the
safety of the existing system?
• How can the knowledge gained from identifying the
causes and contributing factors be transferred to those
responsible for similar existing systems and designers of
similar future systems?
• How can the knowledge gained from identifying the
causes and contributing factors be collected and
maintained so that it is available in an understandable
form for as long as it may be relevant?
• What can be done to encourage designers and engineers
to make use of the available knowledge?
Some of the questions listed above have been considered in
various ways (see for example [6, 10, 15, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26,
27]), but we are unaware of any systematic, detailed research
efforts aimed towards developing methods for providing
cogent, comprehensive answers to all of them. Nor are we
aware of any efforts towards fully enumerating all of the
relevant epistemic questions that should be answered.
3.2 Questions About Future Systems
As difficult to answer as questions about existing systems
may be, the foundational epistemic questions about systems
that have not yet been fielded may be even more difficult to
answer. These future systems can be divided into two main
categories: systems that are intended to replace existing
operational systems; and systems that are truly new. The two
categories share some epistemic questions, and have some
unique ones, also.
Epistemic questions relevant to both categories of future
systems include the following:
• What level of confidence in the safety of the system is
required? That is, how sure must the system developers
(and regulators if the system being developed requires
regulation) be that the system is safe? Is a standard
analogous to ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ strong enough?
Or should the standard be even stronger?
• How do system developers obtain adequate knowledge
about the intended operational environment for the
system?
• How do system developers know that the requirements
developed for the system are sufficient to ensure safety
within the intended operational environment of the
system?
• If sufficient requirements are developed, how do
developers know that a design created to satisfy these
requirements does so in such a way as to preserve the
safety inherent in the requirements?
• Given safety-ensuring requirements and a safety-
preserving design, how do developers (and regulators in
domains in which regulators play a part) know that the
implementation of the design results in a safe system?
• What level of confidence can be legitimately derived
from the results of various methods and tools for
assessing the system? For example, how does a formal
proof of correctness of a model of a part of the system
contribute to the level of confidence compared to
extensive testing of a completed system? What can be
learned from other disciplines that might help to answer
questions such as this [12, 14, 16, 30, 31]?
Recognizing that all requirements, designs, and
implementations include certain assumptions, how do
developers (and regulators) know that these assumptions,
and the implications of them, are sufficiently understood
so that the operational use of the system will conform to •
them?
What is the appropriate level of confidence to be attached
to the satisfaction of standards? This is one of the
questions around which much current debate revolves.
Significant differences of opinion exist concerning the
relative importance of controls on the process used to
develop software, satisfaction of pre-determined
standardized objectives for each software system, and
the development of system-specific safety arguments [1,
2, 8, 9, 29].
• What precautions are necessary to ensure that evaluations
of safety are not biased towards simply trying to
convince a regulator that the system is safe enough to be
deployed?
• When changes are made to an operational system, what
knowledge is required to ensure that those changes do not
adversely affect the safety of the system, and how is that
knowledge analyzed to insure that safety is preserved?
Epistemic questions specific to truly new systems include the
following:
• How is the appropriate level of safety for the system to
be established?
• Is knowledge available from any existing system that
may be helpful in developing the requirements for the
new system?
Are any novel technologies going to be used in the
system? If so, how will the safety aspects of those new
technologies be assessed? In considering these
questions, it is important to recognize that novelty can
sometimes be disguised as simple extensions of existing
approaches. As Petroski wrote, ‘The history of
engineering is full of examples of dramatic failures that
were once considered confident extrapolations of
successful designs’ [26].
Finally, epistemic questions specific to systems that are
created to replace already existing systems include the
following:
• Assuming the new system is intended to be ‘at least as
safe as’ the existing system, how is that baseline to be
established?
• What knowledge about the existing operational system is
required to permit the baseline to be established?
• How is that baseline to be used in evaluating the
expected safety of the new system?
What are the potential safety implications of the
transition from the existing system to the new one? How
long will this transition take? How much can be known
about the safety of the combined systems during the
transition period?
As was true for the questions in the previous section, some of
the questions listed above have been considered in various
ways [4, 13, 17, 21, 22, 24, 32], but no systematic, detailed
research efforts exist for developing cogent, comprehensive
answers to all of them, or for ensuring that all the relevant
questions are enumerated.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented an initial attempt to enumerate a set
of foundational epistemic questions concerning software
system safety. We recognize that this set is incomplete, and
thus are keen to receive comments on these questions from
the conference participants, and plan to revise and expand the
set of questions based on those comments. Potential future
work beyond revision and expansion includes organizing the
questions into a useful taxonomy, explaining how existing
software safety approaches and tools contribute to answering
the questions, and speculating about the future research that is
needed to develop a complete and coherent set of questions
and answers.
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